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Seniority Rights
and Industrial Change:
Zdanok v. Glidden Co.
Most collective bargaining contracts establish a seniority
system under which an employee obtains a preferred
claim to present and future employment based on the
length of his past service. Decisions by management to
relocate an entire plant place great stress on the seniority
system and raise important questions concerning an employer's obligations under the job security provision of a
collective bargainingcontract. In this Article, after analyzing the nature of seniority rights, Professor Blumrosen
deals with the question of whether seniority rights recognized'at the original plant site extend to the new location.
He concludes that the courts can best answer the question by an interpretationof the collective bargaining contract that considers the nature of the system of industrial
relationsand not just the immediate factual situation of a
particularcase.

Alfred W. Blumrosen*
Changes in business organization and production methods are
placing severe stress on economic relationships that developed
under older technological and business conditions.' The seniority
system, which provides job security under collective bargaining,
is one of the institutions that has been subjected to the pressure
of demand for industrial change.
Seniority gives employees a preferred claim to present and future work based on length of past service.2 The seniority principle
assures that as the worker expends his energy, he provides not
* Professor of Law, Rutgers University.
1. For discussions of various phases of the process of technological
change, see

AMERICAN ASSEMBLY AUTOmATION

AND TECHNOLOGICAL

CHANGE (Dunlop ed. 1962); BRADY, ORGANIZATION, AUTOMATION, AND SOCIETY (1961); MICI.IAEL, CYBERNATION (1961).

2. See the full discussion of the scope of the seniority principle in

SLICHTER, HEALY & LIVERNASH, THE IMPACT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
ON MANAGEMENT 104-41 (1960).
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only for his immediate needs but also for an uncertain future.
Once the system is established, men work not only for current
pay but for the expectation of continued employment, barring
certain contingencies, until retirement. Seniority with a firmly established employer may be a valuable asset in case of a recession.
In reliance on expectations of security created by seniority systems, men forego other opportunities and construct their life
patterns. For these reasons, seniority rights are entitled to the fullest judicial protection possible.'
Yet seniority rights cannot be treated as absolute. The collective bargaining process from which they emerge involves the continuous adjustment of terms of the employment relationship. Union
and employer need flexibility to alter elements of this relationship in light of experience or in anticipation of new developments. Furthermore, the union needs flexibility to work out conflicts in seniority claims within its own ranks.
The task of reconciling these complex interests has fallen to the
judiciary in the absence of explicit legislative direction. The courts
have given the unions broad discretion to modify and, in some
instances, to destroy seniority rights in negotiation with management. This discretion is regulated by the principle that the union
must fairly represent all of the employees in the bargaining unit.
The concept of fair representation allows the union considerable
leeway in selecting among various claims.4 One court has become
sufficiently concerned with the importance of seniority to substitute a "fair and reasonable solution" test for the "broad area of
discretion" test in a recent case where the union merged seniority lists incident to a merger of two establishments. 5
The possibilities for change in the organization of the production process have placed the seniority system under severe stress.
A comparison of the cost of union demands with the cost of au3. See the extensive discussion in the relatively early case of Dooley v.
Lehigh Valley R.R., 130 N.J. Eq. 75, 21 A.2d 334 (Ch. 1941), a/I'd
per curiam, 131 N.J. Eq. 468, 25 A.2d 893 (Ct. Err. & App. 1942).
4. See generally Aaron, Some Aspects of the Union's Duty of Fair
Representation, 22 OHIO ST. L.J. 39 (1961); Blumrosen, Legal Protection
for Critical Job Interests: Union-Management Authority Versus Employee
Autonomy, 13 RUTGERS L. REV. 631 (1959); Cox, Rights Under a Labor
Agreement, 69 HARV. L. REV. 601 (1956); Givens, Federal Protection of
Employee Rights Within Trade Unions, 29 FORDHAM L. REV. 259 (1960);
Hanslowe, Individual Rights in Collective Labor Relations, 45 CORNELL
L.Q. 25 (1959); Summers, Individual Rights in Collective Agreements and

Arbitration, 37 N.Y.U.L. REV. 362 (1962).
5. O'Donnell v. Pabst Brewing Co., 12 Wis. 2d 491, 107 N.W.2d 484
(1961). For a discussion of cases dealing with negotiated changes in
seniority rights, see Blumrosen,

Union-Management Agreements Which

Harm Others, 10 J. PUB. L. 345, 366-72 (1961).
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tomating or building a new establishment may give management a
potent bargaining table weapon. This may lead to a contractual
weakening of seniority claims. Management may modify the seniority system or even avoid collective bargaining altogether by
automating or by transferring either the particular work or the
entire plant to another location.
The "plant removal" cases supply a dramatic illustration of
the problem. The movement of a plant places a strain on the
seniority principle along the dimensions of both time and place.
It creates difficulties on the level of policy, legal theory, and contract construction. Many of these difficulties were apparent in the
case of Zdanok v. Glidden Co.,' which has become a cause celebre
in labor law and deserves close examination.
I. FROM MANAGEMENT PREROGATIVE TO A
CONSIDERATION OF THE WriOLE AGREEMENT
Historically, problems of movement of work or plant were approached with a "management prerogative" orientation. Unless the contract in explicit language limited the employer, he
was free to reorganize his business, introduce technological change,
or subcontract. By changing the nature or location of his work
requirements, the employer could avoid obligations of the collective bargaining agreement.'
Collective bargaining has established a complex network of relations between and among union, employer, and employees that
now defies such a simple analysis. Seniority clauses, job classifications, recognition clauses, and guarantees against improper discharges do in fact relate to the work that employees have been
doing under the control of the employer. Thus they are relevant
to the question of management's freedom to act, although this
is not recognized by the management prerogative thesis. The following types of clauses relating the employee to the work are
contained in most collective bargaining agreements.
The recognition clause will normally identify the union as bargaining agent for a certain type of employee-for example,
pro6. 288 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1961), affd on other grounds. 370 U.S. 530
(1962). The Zdanok case has been discussed in Aaron, Reflections on
the Legal Nature and Enforceability of Seniority Rights, 75 HARy. L.
REV. 1532 (1962); Lowden, Survival of Seniority Rights Under Collective
Agreements: Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 48 VA. L. REV. 291 (1962); Note, 37
IND. LJ. 380 (1962); Note, 16 RUTGERS L. REV. 416 (1962); Note, 1962
Wis. L. REV. 520; Comment, 72 YALE LJ. 162 (1962); 61 COLUM. L. REV.

1363 (1961); 110 U. PA. L. REV. 458 (1962).

7. See, e.g., Amalgamated Ass'n of St. Elec. Ry. Employees v. Greyhound Corp., 231 F.2d 585 (5th Cir. 1956).
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duction, maintenance, or clerical employees. This definition of
the relationship between union and employer is based on the assumption that the employer has control over certain job opportunities.8
The job description and classification clause will, with more or
less detail, identify the different operations performed by employees. The identification is useful for several purposes including pay differentials and different lines of seniority. This clause
in turn more specifically relates certain employees to specific
work. 9
Clauses dealing with layoff and recall, the heart of the seniority system, assume that the employment opportunities under the
control of the employer may fluctuate. Layoff is from, and recall
is usually to, a specific job or type of job to which seniority attaches. This intimately relates the employee to the job."0
Clauses protecting employees against discharge except for just
cause, while dealing primarily with employer action based on
conduct or ability of the employee in relation to his job, are also
relevant to the manner in which the employer disposes of opportunities for continued employment.11
These clauses establish a set of relationships between the employee and his work that cannot be ignored. The fundamental reason for the negotiation of such clauses into the collective contract-and for the contract itself-lies in the fact that the employer controls certain employment opportunities. If in exercising
this control the employer can destroy job opportunities for his
employees, he can reduce these clauses to a set of meaningless
abstractions.
The modem collective bargaining agreement has created conflicting claims of employer freedom and employee security that
require evaluation in light of the circumstances of each relation8. See discussion of the various views of arbitrators as to the significance to be attached to the recognition clause in SLICHTER, HEALY &
LIVERNASH, op. cit. supra note 2, at 309-12. Compare the approach of
Arbitrator Dworkin in Weatherhead Co., 30 Lab. Arb. 1067 (1958), with
that of Arbitrator Gray in Hearst Consol. Publications, Inc., 26 Lab. Arb.
723 (1956), on the relation between recognition clauses and subcontracting disputes. A recognition clause does not destroy managerial claims, but
in conjunction with other clauses, it does relate the employee to the work
he has been doing and thus helps to provide a foundation for his claim.
9. See generally SLICHTER, HEALY & LIVERNASH, op. cit. supra note 2,
at 244-79, 558-90.
10. See generally id. at 142-77 for a discussion of layoff and recall
problems in collective bargaining.
11. See, e.g., Hearst Consol. Publications, Inc., 26 Lab. Arb. 723
(1956). But see Local 2040, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Servel, Inc., 268
F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1959), discussed in note 27 infra.
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ship. The management prerogative analysis does not evaluate or
accommodate these conflicting claims. Rather, it summarily rejects
claims based on job security and seniority provisions of the contract. Therefore, the management prerogative thesis conflicts with
the long-established principle of contract law that requires an
examination of all aspects of the agreement in an effort to make
related sense of all of its provisions.' The management prerogative
thesis has accordingly been receiving cooler judicial reception.
As a starting-point from which to begin reasoning toward a
solution to a problem of construction of a collective contract, the
management prerogative thesis was rejected in the Warrior & Gulf
case. 3 There it was argued that management prerogative precluded submission of a subcontracting claim to arbitration. The
Court rejected the management prerogative approach and construed the agreement in light of labor policy favoring arbitration.
The rejection of management prerogative as the premise from
which to begin construction of the labor agreement has implications that go beyond arbitration. Every area of contract law is
affected, including the construction of seniority clauses.
A clear indication of this development is the Webster Electric4 case, holding that subcontracting is an improper dilution
of seniority and related job rights although the contract did not
explicitly limit the right to subcontract. The court reasoned that
subcontracting would necessarily interfere with the employee
claims to work. This decision is the first of its kind.
Given the prevalence of arbitration clauses, the Warrior & Gulf
decision will channel most problems concerning plant removal and
seniority claims into arbitration. The arbitrators tend to deal with
these cases on an ad hoc basis; they have not developed abstract
principles to resolve them.' 5 If the parties have not agreed to
12. For the express application of this principle to a collective bargain-

iag agreement, see Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion in Kennedy v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 16 N.J. 280, 287--88, 108 A.2d 409, 412-13 (1954).
13. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574

(1960). See also United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,
363 U.S. 593 (1960); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S.
564 (1960). The literature concerning these three steelworker cases is

enormous. See, e.g., Aaron, Arbitration in the Federal Courts: Aftermath
of the Trilogy, 9 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 360 (1962); Smith, The Question of
"Arbitrability"-The Role of the Arbitration, the Court, and the Parties,
16 Sw. L.J. 1 (1962); 45 MINN. L. REV. 282 (1960).

14. UAW v. Webster Elec. Co., 299 F.2d 195 (7th Cir. 1962). For an-

other example, see note 26 infra.

15. See the analysis of arbitration cases concerning subcontracting in
Celanese Corp., 33 Lab. Arb. 925 (1959); Note, 37 N.Y.U.L. REV. 523
(1962); Note, 13 RUTGERS L. REV. 702 (1959). Arbitrator Seward
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arbitrate, or if their agreement is not broad enough to cover this
type of dispute, the courts must harmonize stability of employment with managerial freedom to reorganize the productive process.
II.

ZDANOK v. GLIDDEN CO.: "VESTED" OR
"CONTRACTUAL" SENIORITY RIGHTS?

The problem of how to reconcile employment stability with

managerial freedom to relocate was sharply raised in Zdanok
v. Glidden Co. 6 The Glidden Company closed its plant at Elmhurst, Long Island, and laid off its employees. The work previously done at Elmhurst was transferred to a new plant in Beth-

lehem, Pennsylvania. The layoffs took place during the last months
of a collective agreement, and the plant was closed after the contract expired. The Glidden Company agreed to consider the Elm-

hurst employees-some of whom had worked for Glidden for
as long as 25 years-as applicants for new employment at Bethlehem, but refused to recognize seniority that had accrued at Elmhurst.
An attempt by the union to arbitrate the transferability of sen-

iority rights was rebuffed by a New York court. 17 A group of
employees then sued Glidden for violation of the collective contract in federal court. These employees had been laid off while the
examined a group of subcontracting cases in Bethlehem Steel Co., 30 Lab.
Arb. 678, 682 n. (1958). He reported:
It is true that a number of arbitrators have held that Management retains its full right to contract out unless that right is qualified or limited by express contract language. . . . But a number of other arbitrators have held to the contrary-have agreed, in effect, with Cardozo
that "a promise may be lacking, and yet the whole writing may be instinct with an obligation imperfectly expressed" . . . and have found
that an implied bar against contracting out did exist in the cases before them. . . . Within each group of decisions, moreover, there are
conflicts of principle and approach. The Umpire has returned from
his exploration of the cases a sadder-if not a wiser-man, echoing
the plaint of Omar Khayyam:
"Myself when young did eagerly frequent
Doctor and Saint and heard great argument
About it and about: but evermore
Came out by that same door where in I went,"
16. 185 F. Supp. 441 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), rev'd, 288 F.2d 99 (2d Cir.
1961), ajj'd on other grounds, 370 U.S. 530 (1962).
17. In the Matter of General Warehousemen's Union, 10 Misc. 2d 700,
172 N.Y.S.2d 678 (Sup. Ct. 1958). If the issue were to arise today, the
court would probably have ordered arbitration in response to the trilogy of steelworker cases, cited note 13 supra, decided by the Supreme
Court in 1960. See Aaron, Reflections on the Legal Nature and Enforceability of Seniority Rights, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1532, 1554 (1962).
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contract was in effect. The contract entitled employees with more
than five years seniority to be recalled if a suitable opening occurred within three years of layoff. Employees with less than five
years seniority were entitled to preferential re-employment within
two years of layoff. After the expiration of the two and three
year periods, the employees would not be entitled to re-employment, and the employment connection would be severed. The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the seniority
rights did not terminate when the rest of the agreement expired,
but persisted for the additional periods indicated in the contract,
and that these rights attached to the work at the new plant in
Bethlehem.' The court thus protected the seniority claims along
dimensions of time and space.
To conclude that the court based its decision on the abstract
principle that seniority rights had "vested" is neither accurate nor
illuminating. "Vesting" is simply legal shorthand indicating that
relations once established may not be terminated except under
defined conditions. The term "vested" does not itself define these
conditions and therefore cannot determine in any given case
whether seniority rights continue or terminate. While the court
used the term "vested" in its opinion, 9 and while some commentators have concluded that this concept provided the basis
of the decision,20 it seems clear that Zdanok rested on two specific
assumptions.
First, it is obviously important that the employees could "trace"
the work that they had been doing at Elmhurst to the new Bethlehem plant. Glidden had combined elements of several jobs, but
the court did not think that the combination provided any serious obstacle to the usefulness of Elmhurst employees at Bethlehem. If the employer had radically reorganized his production
by automation or otherwise, it might have been impossible for the
employees to trace their jobs. Even if they could have traced
them, a serious question of employee ability to perform these newly designed jobs might have arisen. This ability to trace the work
provides a major limitation on the scope of the decision. The
case dealt with a movement of production facilities, but this movement did not involve drastic rearrangement of the production
process itself.
18. 288 F.2d at 103-04.
19. Id. at 103. The discussion of vested rights in the opinion was

in response to a contention that the seniority provisions of the agreement
expired with the rest of the contract despite the three year right to recall
clause.

20. See Aaron, Reflections on the Legal Nature and Enforceability of
Seniority Rights, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1535, 1548, 1552-53 (1962).

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:505

Second, the court relied heavily on the clause in the collective
agreement that provided for re-employment within a stated time
after layoff. 2 Any discussion of the concept of "vested" seniority
rights must turn on contract provisions that deal with duration
of the right to be recalled to work, for this is the heart of the
seniority system. This point requires amplification.
A.

DURATION OF RIGHT OF RECALL WHERE THE CONTRACT IS
SILENT

If the collective agreement is silent on the matter, an employee
laid off under a contract that recognizes the right of recall is entitled to be recalled during the term of the contract if a suitable
vacancy develops.22 But what happens if, as in Zdanok, the
vacancy develops after the expiration of the contract? If the
contract itself is silent on this matter and there is no later controlling agreement, there are two possible analyses. (1) The
right to recall continues after the expiration of the particular contract because the parties intended to provide meaningful job security for employees laid off at any time during the contract period,
not just for those laid off at its beginning. (2) The promise does
not survive the termination of the contract since the expectations
of the parties concerning a continued employment relationship
are not clear. Unless the opportunity for recall arises during the
contract period, the employee gains no benefit from the promise.
The courts have adopted the latter approach. The leading case3
is System Fed'n No. 59, Ry. Employees v. Louisiana & Ark. Ry.1
In that case, a contract providing for seniority rights was entered
into in 1929. It ran for two years, during which time plaintiffs
were laid off. It was replaced in 1931 by a set of company rules
that did not entitle them to be recalled if their layoffs extended
beyond a year. In 1937, a new collective bargaining agreement
confirmed the arrangements under the 1931 rules. Nearly ten
years after the layoff and after Railway Adjustment Board proceedings, plaintiff sued, contending that the promise to recall extended beyond the life of the agreement and had never been properly terminated. In 1941, the Fifth Circuit rejected his claim, concluding that the promise to recall terminated with the terminal date
of the rest of the contract.
21. 288 F.2d at 102-03.
22. A. D. Juilliard & Co., 15 Lab. Arb. 934 (1951) (Maggs, Arbitrator). But see California Cotton Mills Co., 14 Lab. Arb. 377 (1950) (Marshall, Arbitrator), implying a one-year limitation on the right to be recalled
on the basis of past practices of the parties.
23. 119 F.2d 509 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 656 (1941).
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The law to be applied to this case was the law of 1929, the
date the contract was made. At that time, collective bargaining,
even in the railroad industry, was not firmly established. The
great labor reforms that made collective bargaining the normal
way of administering the employment relation still lay in the future, beyond the Great Depression. Employer responsibility to employees in connection with employment opportunities was not
established, and expectations concerning the stability of seniority
claims had not firmly developed. 24 Thus, as a matter of contract construction under these conditions, the Louisiana & Ark. Ry.
case was probably correct. Furthermore, a decade had intervened
between the time of the alleged contract violation and the decision. During this time, other rights had ripened, and new collective bargaining relations had been established. Under all of these
circumstances, it would have been difficult, if not improper, for
the court to render a decision that might upset these relationships.
Because of the changes in labor-management relations and legal policies toward collective bargaining, this decision, based on
the law of 1929, should not be relied on in 1963 for a point of
contract construction. If the question arose today, a court examining the problem independently of the Louisiana & Ark. Ry. case
might reach a different conclusion. As the underlying economic
and legal realities change-and in this field they have changed
drastically-there is no reason to expect that new parties under
changed circumstances hold the same attitudes toward the issue
under consideration. In light of the currently recognized importance attached to seniority, a construction that protects seniority
claims is more appropriate than one that minimizes them. Until
a court is willing to re-examine the Louisiana & Ark. Ry. case,
however, we will assume that unless the contract specifically provides that seniority rights shall continue after the collective contract has expired, they will not do so. This forces us to focus
sharply on the clause extending the right of recall for a definite
period of time after layoff.
B.

DURATION OF RIGHT OF RECALL IF ESTABLISHED IN THE
CONTRACT

Contract clauses providing for re-employment within a stated
time after layoff are quite common today.' They establish a
terminal date after which seniority claims cannot be asserted by
24. See generally BERNSTEIN, THE LEAN YEARS 144-89 (1960).
25. See generally SLICHTER, HEALY & LIVERNASH, op. cit. supra note 2,
at 104-41.
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the employee. This terminal date may be long after the expiration
date of other terms of the contract. If a man is laid off shortly
before the expiration of the contract, his re-employment rights
under such a clause must persist after the expiration of the rest
of the contract. Any other construction would give maximum
protection to those laid off on the first day of the contract and
none to those laid off on the last, a result not contemplated by any
bargainers in labor relations. In Zdanok, the three-year right of
recall extended beyond the two-year contract from the very first
day of the agreement.
Normally, the question of duration of the right of recall under such a clause will not arise because a subsequent collective
contract will be negotiated. If the new contract simply continues
the existing system, the question of whether an employee's right
arose under the old or the new agreement is not important. If the
new contract extends the right of recall, the only objectors would
be the lower seniority men whose opportunities for advancement
are diluted by the expanded claims of the higher seniority men.
They can attempt to pressure their union not to extend the clause,
but that is the limit of their power.
If the seniority period is reduced, the high seniority men suffer
a diminution in their job security. They may assert that such a
diminution violates the duty of fair representation on the part of
the union.26 All of the complex employee-union issues would
then arise and ultimately the union would be required to justify
its action.
If no subsequent agreement is negotiated, the issue of survival
of recall rights under the expired contract is clearly projected.
The argument that the right of recall "expired" with the termination of the contract has already been dismissed. The parties have
created a situation where the seniority claim may be enforced
after the expiration of other provisions of the contract.27 All
26. The dilution of seniority rights was the principal basis for the holding in Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944), that the union
had violated the duty of fair representation. See Blumrosen, Union-Management Agreements Which Harm Others, 10 J. PUB. L. 345, 358-82
(1961).
27. Local 2040, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Servel, Inc., 268 F.2d 692
(7th Cir. 1959), involved the total discontinuance of manufacturing operations by the employer and the discharge of all employees. The employees
contended that provisions of the contract extending the right to recall
from 12 to 24 months after layoff entitled them to certain benefits that
would accrue in the period after discontinuance of the manufacturing operations. To invoke these provisions, the employees argued that they had
not been discharged for just cause under the contract. The court never
reached the question of the significance of the duration of right to recall
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provisions of the agreement need not terminate at the same time.
In Zdanok, the contract ran for two years, but the right of recall ran for three; obviously, the parties knew that the right of recall extended beyond the expiration of the rest of the contract.
It has been argued that the parties contemplated that a new
contract would be made during this latter period, and that since
this was not done (because of the movement of the plant), the
contract should be ignored." The argument contains an element
of the fanciful. It is a fundamental axiom of labor relations that
the parties contract with reference to an ongoing relationship of indefinite duration and the contract captures and stabilizes certain
elements of that relationship. It is doubtful, however, whether the
parties had any understanding of the consequences that would
result if the union ceased to represent the employees at the end
of the contract period. Their only intention related to an ongoing
employment relationship, and the employment relationship did
continue, albeit without the union. Therefore, it would seem that
this promise should be enforced by its terms against the employer
unless a new collective agreement superseded it or unless the
employee agreed to waive it. Thus construed, the collective agreement in Zdanok contained two terminal dates, one for the seniority clause and the other for the rest of the contract. This analysis
is simple and straightforward as long as one avoids the semantic
trap posed by the word "terminated." For if one asks, "How can
seniority rights persist after the contract is terminated?," the answer is likely to be that they cannot. But to say that seniority
rights "terminated" assumes the point in issue. In the Zdanok
case, the seniority rights did not terminate, but continued for up
provisions because it held that the discontinuance of business justified the
discharge of the employees independently of the just cause provision of
the contract, relying on the management prerogative thesis developed in
Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Order of R.R. Telegraphers, 264 F.2d 254 (7th
Cir. 1959). The latter decision was reversed in Order of R.R. Telegraphers
v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 362 U.S. 330 (1960). The Supreme Court held

that the management prerogative argument did not justify enjoining the
union from striking over demands concerning the curtailment of jobs.
Reliance on the Chicago & North Western case makes clear that the court
in Servel was concerned only with the discontinuance of a manufacturing
operation. Whether or not it was correct in its decision, the case is clearly
not significant in connection with cases of plant removal where the manu-

facturing operations continue. The history of the Chicago & North
Western case, on which the Servel decision was based, provides another
example of the judicial rejection of the management prerogative thesis
as the basis for construction of collective agreements. See text accompanying
notes 7-12 supra.
28. 61 COLUM. L. REv. 1363, 1365 (1961).

29. Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953).
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to three years after layoff. This is what the court of appeals
meant by the "vesting" of these rights.3"
C.

DURATION OF RIGHT OF RECALL IF LAYOFF TAKES PLACE
AFTER THE CONTRACT EXPIRES

Suppose the employee had been laid off after the "expiration"
of the contract? Could he invoke the three-year-recall provision?
The answer would seem to be no-at least, not directly. Seniority
claims must be related to a contract made by the employer. 3'
Once the collective contract has expired, it cannot provide the
foundation for claims to seniority benefits on behalf of employees
thereafter laid off. Those employees who continue to work after
expiration of the contract are presumably employed under individual employment contracts that became effective when the collective contract expired.32
In the absence of an express employment contract, it is a judicial function to define the elements of this "implied in fact" contract. In determining the reasonable value of the employee's services, the past employment contract-here a collective agreement
-- establishes the standard. 33 Since compensation under a collective contract takes various forms, it may be difficult to approximate the value of that compensation.
1.

ConvertingFringeBenefits Into a Wage

The court could establish the value of all the fringe benefits,
seniority, and the like, and convert it into a weekly or hourly
wage. This would result in a substantial increase in the hourly cost
of labor in many instances. Fringe benefits, which cannot easily
be measured, represent up to 14 percent of an employee's wages. 4
30. This analysis of Zdanok is confirmed in Procter & Gamble Independent Union v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 312 F.2d 181, 186 (2d
Cir. 1962), and is consistent with Black-Clawson Co. v. International Ass'n
of Machinists, 313 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1962).
31. Elder v. New York Cent. R.R., 152 F.2d 361 (6th Cir. 1945).
32.
Men may continue work after a collective agreement expires and,
despite negotiations in good faith, the negotiation may be deadlocked

or delayed; in the interim express or implied individual agreements
may be held to govern. The conditions for collective bargaining may not
exist . . . . As the employer in these circumstances may be under no
legal obligation to bargain collectively, he may be free to enter into
individual contracts.
J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 337 (1944).
33. See I WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 90 (Jaeger ed. 1957). For discussions
of judicial treatment of the survival of other types of employee benefits
after expiration of the collective contract, see Note, 54 Nw. U.L. REV.
646 (1959): Note, 16 RUTGERS L. REV. 416 (1962).
34. 182 Daily Labor Rept., Sept. 18, 1962, § B, p. 7.

1963]

ZDANOK v. GLIDDEN CO.

The employees would thus earn more take-home pay without a
collective contract than with it. This approach would add to the
union's bargaining power since working without a contract might
become expensive for the employer. Furthermore, the valuation
of seniority, pension, arbitration, and other rights would be very
difficult. The time and energy involved would not be worth the result.
2.

IgnoringFringeBenefits

The court could ignore the value of all such nonwage benefits
and award on the principle of quantum meruit only the same cash
wage as that earned under the expired collective contract. While
simpler, this alternative would be unfair to the employee because
it would reduce his wages to a level below that established by the
collective agreement. Such a reduction-14 percent of an employee's wages in the typical case-is unjustifiable. Presumably,
the services are worth as much the day after the collective contract expired as they were the day before.
3.

IncorporatingCertain Terms of the Collective Contract

The court could adopt an analogy from the law of individual
employment contracts' and of tenants holding over after the
expiration of a lease, 6 and continue in the individual contract
the terms of the collective bargaining contract until they are
changed by an express contract between the employer and the
employee.3 7 This alternative provides the most convenient measure for valuing the employee's services. Furthermore, it encourages
the employer to make new bargains with the individual employees.
The problem of incorporation of the terms of an expired collective agreement into the succeeding individual employment contract has been recently examined in Procter & Gamble Independent Union v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co. s In that case, the
union sought arbitration of grievances that arose after a collective contract had expired and before a later collective agreement
was negotiated. Neither collective agreement expressly covered
the period in which the grievances arose, but during this interval
35. See note 32 supra. See also Martin v. Campanaro, 156 F.2d 127
(2d Cir. 1956); Art Wire & Stamping Co. v. Johnson, 141 NJ. Eq. 101,
56 A.2d 11 (Ch. 1947), affd, 142 N.J. Eq. 723, 61 A.2d 240 (Ct. Err.
& App. 1948).

36. 1 CoRBiN, CONTRAcTs § 96 (1959).
37. On the continued relevance of selected common-law rules in labor
relations, see Cox, The Legal Nature of Collective Bargaining Agreements,
57 MIcH. L. Rrv. 1, 14-15 (1958).
38. 202 F. Supp. 518 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 312 F.2d 181 (2d Cir. 1962).
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the employees continued to work and the employer made no significant changes in the conditions of employment.
The district court ordered arbitration on the grounds that the
right to arbitrate was one of the conditions of the continuing relationship of employer and employee even after the collective
agreement expired. The court of appeals reversed, construing the
arbitration clause of the expired contract to permit only the
union or the employer, but not the employee, to secure arbitration.3 9 The court reasoned that since the employee had no right
to arbitrate under the collective agreement, its expiration could
not provide the basis for the recognition of such a right. The
collective contract did not create an expectation of an individual
right to arbitrate that the court could be called upon to recognize
in the succeeding individual contract.
By examining the relevant terms of the expired collective agreement to determine if it should be incorporated into the individual
contract, the court utilized the analysis suggested here. Once it
was determined from an examination and interpretation of the
collective agreement that the claimed arbitration provision did
not run to the individual but only to the union, the court properly
denied the petition for arbitration. Since only arbitration was
sought, the court was not required to interpret or construe the
terms of individual employment contracts that were effective on
the dates of the grievances.
Given the interpretation of the collective agreement and the
type of relief requested in Procter & Gamble, the decision was
sound. Unfortunately, the court used some general language not
necessary to the decision that may cast doubt on the validity of
the process of incorporating relevant terms of an expired collective contract into succeeding individual employment contracts.
It stated that once the collective contract expired, "there is no
ground whatever for considering that the old agreement still gov39. The arbitration clause is ambiguous on the question of whether an
employee may secure arbitration. See 312 F.2d at 185 n.4. The definition
of grievances includes disputes between employer and employee, and such
grievances relating to the interpretation and application of the agreement
are arbitrable. However, union and employer are to select the arbitrators.
This would not necessarily deny the employee's right to submit disputes to
the arbitrator. Section 5 of the arbitration clause confines the arbitrator
to issues submitted by the employer and the union and makes no mention
of the individual. This is the strongest language in support of the court's
conclusion. A contrary construction of the arbitration clause would have
been permissible. See Gilden v. Singer Mfg. Co., 145 Conn. 117, 139 A.2d
611 (1958). But the Second Circuit has decided against such a construction.
See Black-Clawson Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 313 F.2d 179
(2d Cir. 1962).
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erns the relationship of the parties .... ."" The reference here
is ambiguous. If by "parties" the court meant the relation between union and employer, it was clearly correct because the
agreement had expired. 4 If by "parties" the court meant the relation between employer and individual employee, the statement
would be technically true because individual, not collective, contracts would govern the relationship. But if these individual contracts incorporate some terms of the expired collective contract,
then the expired collective contract would, in a loose sense at
least, "govern" the relationship between the parties. The court
discussed this possibility only in connection with the arbitration
clause.
Having held that the arbitration clause of the expired collective
contract did not inure to the benefit of the individual employee,
the court went on to state:
[E]ven if it could be argued that employees had any right to compel
arbitration under the [expired] collective agreement . . . there
would be no more reason to hold that that right survived the expiration of the agreement to arbitrate than there would be to hold that
the union's right so survived.4
This language would seem to oppose the incorporation theory,
at least where arbitration clauses are concerned. The court suggests that the reason for denying the union the right to arbitrate
would also justify denying the individual the right to arbitrate.
But this reasoning is unsatisfactory. The reason for denying the
union's right to arbitrate is that the collective agreement that
created the right had expired by its own terms. This cannot be said
of the claimed individual contract right to arbitrate. The individual
contract right did not come into existence until the collective
agreement had expired. Therefore, the reason for denying the
union's right to arbitrate-the expiration of the collective contract
-- cannot possibly provide the basis for denial of the individual
employee's right to arbitrate under the terms of an individual employment contract that the court must construct upon termination
of the collective agreement.
In the case put by the court, where the collective agreement
provided for an individual right to arbitrate and the men continued to work after its expiration with no changes in the condi40. 312 F.2d at 184.

41. This is the most probable meaning of the sentence. The cases cited

for the proposition are all cases in which the issue was whether the col-

lective bargaining agreement had expired or was still in effect by reason of
various informal extensions when the matter in litigation took place.
42. 312 F.2d at 186.
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tions of employment mentioned,4 3 there is no reason why the
individual employment contracts could not be interpreted to include this right. The enforceability of the right would depend on
state, not federal, law. Under the common law or state statutes
that enforce only written arbitration agreements, the promise
might not be enforceable." But these problems should await
disposition in appropriate cases. In any event, Procter & Gamble
deals only with an arbitration clause and not with the problem of
incorporating other substantive terms of an expired collective contract into the succeeding individual contract. Thus, Procter &
Gamble need not be read as rejecting the principle that the expired collective contract provides the standard for determining the
terms of the succeeding individual employment contract.
Incorporating the terms of the collective bargaining agreement
into the individual employment contract is the least difficult to
apply of the three alternatives. It is relatively simple for the courts
to administer if the distinction suggested in Procter & Gamble
-that terms of a collective contract running exclusively to the
union cannot be so incorporated-is kept in mind. The incorporation theory combines practicality and fairness-practicality by
enabling the employer to restructure his employment relationship
when the contractual collective contract has expired by posting
a notice of changed conditions; fairness by requiring the employer to disabuse the employees of expectations of continued
treatment in conformity with the collective agreement. This bur43. Ibid.

44. At common law, agreements to arbitrate were not enforceable.

See STURGES, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND AWARDS 82-84 (1930). Under statutes in many states, agreements in writing to arbitrate have been
made enforceable. See N.Y. CIV. PRAC. ACT § 1449, which presumably
would govern the dispute in the Procter & Gamble case since it arose on
Staten Island, New York.
Once it is assumed that state rather than federal law governs the interpretation of such individual contracts, the problem of federal court jurisdiction emerges once again. Except on some theory of protective jurisdiction, these cases would not seem to fall within the federal question jurisdiction of the district courts. They do not arise under § 301 of the TaftHartley Act. 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1958). It might be
argued, however, that the interpretation of the individual employment contracts must follow the federal substantive law in related areas under both
§ 301 and §§ 7, 8, and 9 of the Taft-Hartley Act. 61 Stat. 140-46 (1947),
29 U.S.C. §§ 157-59 (1958). These statutory provisions may establish a
sufficient federal question basis for such actions. Since the federal question
issue turns on the pleadings initially, the matter cannot be disposed of in the
abstract, but only on examination of the particular case. This discussion
should indicate that the matter is sufficiently intricate, both as a matter of
federal jurisdiction and as a matter of applicable substantive law, to require more extended treatment in appropriate cases than was given in the
Procter& Gamble decision.

1963]

ZDANOK v. GLIDDEN CO.

den should rest on the employer, who preserves the initiative to
make changes in the individual employment contract.
The principle of incorporation would include the seniority
clause in the expired collective contract. An employee laid off
after a collective agreement had expired might be able to establish that the right to be recalled had become a part of the individual employment contract that superseded it unless the employer
had negotiated a new individual employment contract that denied
such expectations.45
In summary, if the collective contract contains a promise to
re-employ in order of seniority after the contract's "terminal date,"
the promise is enforceable according to its terms on behalf of an
employee laid off during the contract period. It cannot be enforced by an employee laid off after the collective contract expired, but he may be able to establish that the terms of the collective contract carried over into his individual contract and
thus indirectly enforce it.
III.

TERRITORIAL SCOPE OF RIGHT TO RECALL

If the employer moves his plant, do seniority rights that are
recognized at the original site extend to the new location?" If
45. The case of*Owens v. Press Publishing Co., 20 N.J. 537, 120 A.2d
442 (1956) is often cited for the proposition that terms of the collective
contract (in that case, severance pay) are not to be incorporated into the
individual contracts that come into existence after the collective agreement
expires. In that case, employees worked for some time after a collective
agreement, expired, were discharged, and sought severance pay. The court
held that they were entitled to severance pay measured by their length of
service under the collective agreement, but not by service under the subsequent individual contracts. The court stated that it would not give the
collective contract such in futuro effect. An examination of the case discloses that within a week after the collective agreement expired, individual
contracts that did not provide for severance pay were entered into between
employer and employee. Thus the court properly held that severance pay
rights did not accumulate under the individual contracts, but the principle
of nonincorporation of collective contract terms into individual contracts
was clearly irrelevant since the parties had entered into individual contracts that did not provide for severance pay. See Blumrosen, Labor Law
1954-1956, 11 RUTGERS L. REV. 171, 178-82 (1956).
46. Whether the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (Taft-Hartley
Act), 61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1958), as amended, 73 Stat. 519
(1959), 29 U.S.C. § 401 (Supp. 11, 1962), has been violated by the move
is not germane to the question of whether the employer breached its contract. Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962). A breach of
contract, however, might provide one basis for a finding by the NLRH
that the employer has violated the statute. See the discussion in Aaron,
Reflections on the Legal Nature and Enforceability of Seniority Rights,
75 HARV. L. REV. 1532, 1557 (1962). Recent NLRB decisions suggest
that the decision of whether to relocate a plant may now fall within the
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the parties have dealt explicitly with the contingency of plant
movement in the contract, the only judicial or arbitral function
7
is to implement and enforce their agreement. The problem is
more complex in connection with clauses that were drafted to
meet some other problem but bear indirectly on the problem of
plant removal. When dealing with these clauses, the courts must
be wary of following the parties' intention into a legal wilderness. This temptation is often presented by the introductory clause
in the contract that identifies the subject matter of the agreement.
In Zdanok, for example, the contract provided that it was made
by the company "for and on behalf of its plant facilities located
at Corona Avenue and 94th Street, Elmhurst, Long Island, New
York."4 It was argued that this clause limited the territorial scope
of the contract, making seniority rights inapplicable to a new plant
in another location. The majority of the court of appeals
in Zdanok quite sensibly concluded that the "statement of location was nothing more than a reference to the then existing situation, and had none of the vital significance which the defendant
would attach to it."49 Unless the clause identifying the location
of the employer's operation had been a focal point of dispute
over the territorial scope of the agreement, the majority in Zdanok
is correct. The identification of the location of the employer normally does not carry with it any disposition of- the question of
whether the employees are entitled to follow the work to a new
plant. Pursuing the intent of the parties through such clauses is
difficult and unreliable.
The difficulties in attempting to rely on either the language of
the recognition clause or the history of collective bargaining negotiations, neither of which were directed to the issue of plant movement, are vividly demonstrated by the opinions of the courts in
Oddie v. Ross Gear & Tool Co."0 One stands unconvinced by the
range of mandatory bargaining. See Town & Country Mfg. Co., 136 N.L.
R.B. No. 111 (1962).
47. See Local 127, United Shoe Workers v. Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co., 298
F.2d 277 (3d Cir. 1962).
48. 288 F.2d at 103.
49. Id. at 104.
50. 195 F. Supp. 826 (E.D. Mich. 1961), rev'd, 305 F.2d 143 (6th Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 941 (1963). The recognition clause provided:
The Company recognizes the union as the exclusive representative of
its employees in its plant or plants which are located in that portion of
the greater Detroit area which is located within the city limits of
Detroit for the purpose of collective bargaining ....
305 F.2d at 147. The district court and the court of appeals differed on
the significance of this clause. The district court said that although this
clause appears to limit the territorial scope of the contract, it was negotiated when the union gave up a claim to represent employees in another
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court of appeals' adherence to the "plain meaning" of the contract and unpersuaded by the reasons given by the district court as
to why the contract should be read as covering the work when

moved. The basic problem of reconciling the interest in managerial freedom with the reasonable expectations of employees cannot
be resolved solely by reference to the language of an agreement

that was not drafted with the problem in mind. The fact that the
parties did not agree to resolve the conflicting claims cannot be
treated as a resolution in favor of one side or the other or as a
denial that any conflict exists. Additional factors must be considered before the problem can be appropriately resolved.
A.

CONSTRUCTION

OF SENIORITY CLAUSES

IN LIGHT OF NA-

TIONAL LABOR POLICY

The Zdanok decision combines pragmatic and policy considerations. If the employees can follow the work without difficulty,
there seems to be no reason why they should not do so. They have
established many years of association with the work, and no other
employees have claims to it. Management could continue to have
them as useful workers.51 Why not construe the contract so as to
recognize their claims? What is the hazard in this construction?
plant located in the Detroit area, but outside the city limits. Thus it
did not deal with the question of territorial scope when the employer
moved his plant to a new location. 195 F. Supp. at 828-30. But the court
of appeals held that the language unambiguously determined territorial
scope. The reference to more than one plant meant that this language is not
merely descriptive as in Zdanok. 305 F.2d at 149. Thus, the court of
appeals would have the narrower clause in Zdanok give greater territorial
scope to the contract than the broader one in this case.
Also, the union had attempted to secure a clause providing that if the
employer moved his plant, the union was to be recognized as bargaining
agent at the new location and the matters of transferring employees,
severance pay, and the like would become bargainable. This clause was not
included in the contract. The significance attached to this history was
also assessed differently by the district and circuit courts. The district court
said that this proposal was inspired by rumors that operations in Detroit
would be transferred to an existing plant of the employer in Indiana. Once
the union learned that another local of the same union was the bargaining
agent at the Indiana plant, it dropped the demand, believing that transfer
problems could be worked out between the locals. The demand and its dropping had nothing whatever to do with the establishment of a totally new
plant of the employer, and the rejection of the clause was irrelevant to the
present problem. 195 F. Supp. at 830. But the court of appeals held that the
proposal of this clause showed that the union did not believe that the contract would apply if the plant were moved. In conjunction with other statements of the union, this showed the union's understanding of the meaning
of the contract. The practical construction given by the parties to the
agreement, by their actions, was controlling. Only after Zdanok was decided did the union claim legal rights under the contract. Their behavior
prior to Zdanok was indicative of their understanding. 305 F.2d at 150-51.
51.
We can see no expense or embarrassment to the defendant which
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To answer these questions, the courts must consider the possible consequences of their decision and choose among the alternatives. It is this choice that makes the policy element relevant
in the process of construing contracts. Policy-making through the
judicial process is difficult at best. These difficulties are compounded when this task is performed in the contractual context
because reference to parties' intention makes it difficult to iden-

tify nonconsensual considerations. Furthermore, formulation of a
national labor policy concerning movement of work and seniority
claims is a function of the legislative and executive branches
of government. Only if no such policy can be identified should

the courts apply their own conceptions of labor policy to these
cases.
At least four relevant expressions of national labor policy can
be found that give guidance in the Zdanok-type case. (1) Depressed area legislation is designed to promote the growth of new
industries, not the transplantation of existing ones. Thus, the national legislative policy recognizes the interest of existing employees in continuing their jobs, and plant movement that creates
The national labor policy
unemployment is disfavored. 2 (2)
on mergers, which is relevant by analogy, recognizes the claims
of existing employees. In the railroad industry, the claims are rec-

ognized for four years.53 (3)

The President's Committee on

Automation set the following framework for its consideration:
would have resulted from its adopting the more rational, not to say
humane, construction of its contract. The plaintiffs were, so far as appears, competent and satisfactory employees. .

.

. It would seem that

they would have been at least as useful employees as newly hired applicants. The defendant's Bethlehem plant was a new plant. There
could not have been an existing union representative or a collective
bargaining agreement there, at the time the plant was opened.
288 F.2d at 104.
52. The Area Redevelopment Act § 2, 75 Stat. 47 (1961), 42 U.S.C.
§ 2501 (Supp. 1962), provides in its declaration of congressional purpose
that:
[U]nder the provisions of this chapter new employment opportunities
should be created by developing and expanding new and existing facilities and resources rather than by merely transferring jobs from
one area of the United States to another.
This policy is made more explicit in § 2505(a) of the act, which authorizes the Secretary of Commerce to make loans to assist the relocation of
businesses:
unless the Secretary has reason to believe that such branch, affiliate,
or subsidiary is being established with the intention of closing down
the operations of the existing business entity in the area of its original
location or in any other area where it conducts such operations.
53. See the discussion of the emergence of this policy in the railroad
industry in Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes v. United
States, 366 U.S. 169 (1961). See also Telegraph Merger Act § 222(0, 57
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First, automation and technological progess are essential to the general welfare, the economic strength, and the defense of the nation.
Second, this progress can and must be achieved without the sacrifice of human values and without inequitable cost in terms of individual interests.

Third, the achievement of maximum technological development
without adequate safeguards against economic injury to individuals depends upon a combination of private and governmental action, consonant with the principles of the free society.M

(4) Many collective bargaining agreements provide for the
transfer of employees with the work, an indication that the participants in collective bargaining believe that such a transfer system
is a feasible part of the collective bargaining process and not just
a dream unrelated to the realities of collective bargaining.' All
of these considerations support the decision made in Zdanok to
treat the contract as covering the work when moved.
There are two countervailing considerations. One is the desire
to promote flexibility in the organization of productive processes
to achieve optimum utilization of all resources. The other is the
principle that initial decisions rest with management except as
modified by collective bargaining. These considerations are not
persuasive, however. The movement of a given plant may not
represent an improvement in the utilization of resources, particularly when trained employees are displaced. Even if freedom of
plant movement is desirable, it does not follow that this freedom
should be promoted by allowing the employer to ignore claims
based on seniority. The national policy as thus far developed implies that the employer has some obligation toward his employees.
There are other ways of encouraging economic changes, such as
affording tax advantages and other economic incentives, that do
not impose the burden of change on the workers involved. The
difficulty with the second consideration is that management has
already, through collective bargaining, qualified its right to exercise independent judgment in this area. At issue is the extent of
qualification, not its existence.
Stat. 5 (1943), 47 U.S.C. § 222(f) (1958), which also protects employees
for four years after the merger. In connection with protection of employees

incident to airline mergers, see Kent v. CAB, 204 F.2d 263 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 826 (1953); Outland v. CAB, 284 F.2d 224 (D.C. Cir.
1960); Brown, Employee Protection and the Regulation of Public Utilities:
Mergers, Consolidations and Abandonment of Facilities in the Transportation Industry, 63 YALE L.I. 445 (1954).
54. President's Advisory Committee on Labor-Management Policy,
The Benefits and Problems Incident to Automation and Other Technological Advances, 49 L.R.R.M. 35 (1962).
55. See Judge Palmieri's discussion in Zdanok, 185 F. Supp. at 447.
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At the root of the problem is the choice of protecting the individual claims of employees caught up in the wave of industrial
change or of allowing these claims to be submerged. To fail to
protect the employee condemns him to a set of patchwork policies
for dealing with technologically displaced employees. He faces
additional problems if he is an older worker. Since in the past we
have adhered to the seniority system, it seems harsh at this juncture to throw it overboard.
B.

CONSEQUENCES OF ZDANOK IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

If individual claims are to be honored as the tide of business
and technological change sweeps over us, the judiciary is the only
institution equipped by training and tradition to provide the protection. Other forces at work in our society to minimize these
claims are powerful; they do not need the support of the courts
to make themselves felt.
The Zdanok decision forces management to spell out in the
contract those rights of which it wishes to be assured. By forcing
articulation of management claims, disputes will be resolved in a
way that reflects the position of the parties rather than the theories
of courts, text writers, or arbitrators.56
It has been argued that the right to follow the work recognized
in Zdanok will not be extensively exercised, but will be waived in
exchange for a little more severance pay.5" Such a result will
simply reflect the needs of the parties as expressed in collective
bargaining. Moving to a new location entails many difficult decisions for workers. Some may prefer to remain in familiar surroundings and seek new work. Collective bargaining decisions
may reflect this attitude by exchanging the right to move for severance pay. But the possibility that these rights may be translated
into dollars should not weigh against their recognition. Law in
labor relations does not dictate the choices that union, management, and employee must make. It creates a framework within
which the various decisions are worked out. The parties are free
to shape their own actions within this framework. One method
that provides flexibility is the ability to convert rights into money.
Professor Aaron has suggested that automation, which has
drastically changed our concepts of work, may cause the sen56. See Aaron, Arbitration in the Federal Courts: Aftermath of the
Trilogy, 9 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 360, 379-80 (1962).

57. See, e.g., Giordano v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 203 F. Supp. 905 (D.N.
J. 1962); Johnson v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 203 F. Supp. 636 (E.D.
Mich. 1962); Aaron, Reflections on the Legal Nature and Enforceability
of Seniority Rights, 75 HARv. L. REV. 1532, 1562-63 (1962).
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iority principle itself to become obsolete.58 Men may have to adjust to several job changes, and the furor over Zdanok will then
have proved to be a transient tempest. This, of course, is no criticism of Zdanok. It is a variation of the "long run" argument
that is refuted by recognizing that the task of the courts, in cases
such as Zdanok, is to fashion wise decisions for the present as our
economy enters an era whose end we cannot anticipate. In the performance of that task, the Zdanok case stands as a reminder that
expectations rooted in the seniority system are not to be disregarded.
The argument that industrial change should be promoted by
restricting seniority claims and expanding management freedom
misses the mark. Assuming that industrial change is desirable, it
does not follow that the courts should make matters worse for
dislocated employees by a restrictive construction of seniority
clauses in labor contracts. National policy does not allow the
employer to escape significant responsibility for the plight of his
employees who are caught up in the process of industrial change.
In fact, by giving employees the protection of the Zdanok decision, the courts may clarify the conditions under which industrial
innovations will take place, thus paving the way for wiser and
more humane solutions to some of the problems implicit in industrial change. For example, if the Zdanok decision adds considerably to the cost of relocating a plant, employers may be moved to
support more extensive governmental programs that will help
relieve them from the brunt of the costs of relocation.
C.

JuDIcIAL DECISION AS A FACTOR SHAPING NATIONAL LABOR
POLICY

The basic problems created by the technological revolution of
our time do not create such clear-cut legal issues as the problem of plant removal. The reorganization of the productive process to eliminate various types of jobs, establish new skill requirements, and make obsolete the old falls within the area of collective bargaining. While the duty to bargain over such changes appears clear, the content of the bargain remains unregulated. Bargaining practices in the form of retraining programs, enhanced
severance pay, and the like have emerged.
The issues in the case of a simultaneous reduction and alteration in jobs that accompany automation also center around seniority. 9 The older rule that seniority may be negotiated away
58. Id. at 1563.

59. See, e.g., Panza v. Armco Steel Corp., 208 F. Supp. 50 (W.D. Pa.
1962).
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easily may no longer adequately protect employee claims to jobs
that remain. Broadening of protection for seniority is one way of
cushioning the shock of automation. Accompanying this should
be enhanced judicial concern for seniority claims within the limits of technological developments that force greater emphasis on
employees' abilities.
The most intensive study privately conducted to date has indicated that the problems transcend the capacity of the parties and
require solutions by government." The network of worker retraining programs, extended unemployment compensation, and
other governmental programs all bear heavily on the problem of
industrial change and job security. The conventional concept of
job security with a particular employer through collective bargaining may protect an employee against a territorial movement of
the productive facility, but it cannot protect him against technological displacement. Nevertheless, judicial recognition of seniority
claims may be the essential foundation of a more extensive social response to the vast problems created by the emergence of
an automated society. Once it is clear that the costs of this development cannot be allocated to the affected workers, the likelihood
of a more balanced national solution is enhanced.
CONCLUSION
In grappling with problems of such a deep and basic nature as
the changes created by our technological revolution, we must
utilize some premise rooted in the past for the resolution of today's issues. The basic question before the judiciary when industrial change conflicts with seniority claims is whether to view
these problems contractually or contextually, whether to focus on
the ramifications of the problem or only on the immediate and
narrowest considerations in each specific case.
This question of breadth of judicial focus is another way of
describing the difference between an approach based on contract
and one based on status. The contract approach emphasizes the
immediate concrete relations of the parties; the status approach
demands that these relations be viewed within a wider setting.
Perhaps, as Professor Aaron has suggested, it is no longer useful
to discuss employee rights within the framework of the distinction
between contract and status.61 The fact is that employees today
60. Armour & Co. Automation Comm., Progress Report, 48 L.R.R.M.
239 (1961) (unbound).

61. Aaron, Reflections on the Legal Nature and Enforceability of Seniority Rights, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1532, 1564 (1962).
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are caught up in a system of industrial relations that transcends
the immediate contracting situation. As long as courts will consider the employee's rights and obligations within this system, it
matters not whether the discussion is cast in terms of contract
or status.
The contract approach has historically fragmented the relation
and focused on its narrowest aspects. This Article demonstrates
that the contract analysis is not necessarily so limited. Plant removal can be adequately analyzed and resolved within a contractual framework that considers the broader implications of these
problems.
The wisdom of the Zdanok decision lies in its synthesis of the
contract and status considerations. The decision protects employee
rights to transfer with the work, subject to such contractual limitations as may be agreed to by the immediate parties. By placing
the burden of limitation on those who would negate seniority
rights, the court has provided some small measure of protection
for the worker caught up in the process of industrial change.

